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 RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS AND THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
James Steven Rogers*
It is a Cinderella moment for the law of restitution. Mter
decades of being overshadowed by its stepsisters tort and contract,
restitution finally has been invited to the ball. Indeed, it gets its
own ball-the proposed Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.! The law of restitution is
basking in the glow of renewed publicity and is enjoying the
attentions of its own Prince Charming in the person of Professor
Andrew Kull, who is doing superb work as the reporter for the
project.
Perhaps the most important thing about the current
Restatement project is simply that it is being done. That alone goes
a long way to bringing the subject from the obscurity and confusion
that has surrounded it for decades. I hope that I will not be
misunderstood if I offer a criticism of one aspect of the current
project, for my criticism is, I think, very much in the spirit of the
project itself. My fear is that in the area of restitution for wrongs
the current draft of the proposed Restatement pushes Cinderella
back to the garret, to languish in the shadow of her stepsister, the
law of tort. Ironically, that treatment comes as part of a project that
on another matter-benefits obtained by breach of contrace-has
* Professor, Boston College Law School.
1. Unless otherwise noted, references herein are to the draft discussed at
the 2005 annual meeting of the American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
I use the term "restitution" to describe a cause of action based on the
unjust enrichment principle. There is much to be said for a different
terminological convention, under which one would use the phrase "unjust
enrichment" when speaking of the substantive cause of action, and restitution
when speaking of the remedy. However, I follow the usage of the current
Restatement project, tolerating some ambiguity on that point. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. c
(Discussion Draft, 2000).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(Tentative Draft No.4, 2005)
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boldly carved out a place for restitution despite the common view
that her other stepsister, the law of contract, should be the sole belle
ofthat ball.
But enough, for now, of metaphor.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps after the current Restatement project has been
completed and the profession has become familiar with it, it will be
possible to discuss a specific topic within the law of restitution
without an introduction explaining terminology. But we are still far
from that point. Cases are still filled with passages such as:
As stipulated by the parties, the issue for decision was
whether "the Defendants, or any of them, breached any
contract with Plaintiff, written or oral, in fact or implied." We
read the mention of "implied" contracts as a reference to the
doctrine of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, under which
courts imply a contract as a matter of law where necessary to
avoid unjust enrichment. This interpretation is based in part
upon the apparent intent of parties in distinguishing "implied
contracts" and contracts "in fact," and draws further support
from the inclusion of unjust enrichment claims in the
complaint,3
Or:
Finally, plaintiff assigns error to the trial court's denial of
its motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence it
presented at trial. The motion did not supply the proposed
pleadings, but we infer, based on plaintiff's brief, that it sought
to add a specification seeking to recover $298.78 for parts and
labor that it supplied and that defendant did not pay for. That
specification, presumably, would have been in equity based on
some theory such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. ...
Here, granting plaintiff's motion would have injected an
equitable claim based in quasi-contract into a legal action
based on statutory law"
Let us not mince words. These passages are little short of
gibberish. "Quantum meruit." "Contract implied in law." "Quasi
contract." "Equitable claim." These are nifty-sounding lawyer
phrases. But it is rare to encounter a lawyer who can use them with
any precision. And, I must add, that is mostly because we law
professors have not done a competent job of training law students in
the law of restitution. The key to understanding the relationship
3. Cablevision of Breckenridge, Inc. v. Tannhauser Condo. Ass'n, 649 P.2d
1093, 1096 (Colo. 1982).
4. Pro Car Care, Inc. v. Johnson, 118 P.3d 815, 820 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
 2007] RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS 57
among tort, contract, and restitution is to think about the central
organizing principle of each body of law.
Tort. The central substantive notion is that one must not
(unjustifiably) harm another. The correlative remedial principle
might be expressed as "a party who unjustifiably harms another
owes a duty to pay a sum of money that will compensate the other
for the harm."
Contract. The central substantive notion is that one must not
(unjustifiably) fail to perform one's promise to another. The
correlative remedial principle might be expressed as "a party who
unjustifiably fails to perform a promise to another owes a duty to
pay a sum of money that will put the non-breaching party where she
would have been if the promise had been performed."
Restitution. The central substantive notion is that one must not
(unjustifiably) enrich oneself at the expense of another. The
correlative remedial principle might be expressed as "a party who
unjustifiably enriches himself at the expense of another owes a duty
to pay a sum of money that will disgorge the enrichment."
In some situations, only one of these bodies of law applies. In
other situations, they overlap. Consider these three hypothetical
scenarios:
Case One. Debbie hits Paul with a baseball bat, causing him
great injury. Paul sues Debbie.
Case Two. Debbie owns the baseball bat that Babe Ruth used
to hit his last home run. She promises to sell that bat to Paul.
Later, she regrets the agreement and refuses to deliver. Paul sues
Debbie.
Case Three. Paul owns the baseball bat that Babe Ruth used to
hit his last home run. He sells it for $250,000 and decides to donate
the money to the Baseball Hall of Fame. He packages up $250,000
in currency5 and sends it, along with a letter saying "Here's a
donation of the money I received from selling the Babe's bat," to "B-
ball Hall of Fame, Springfield, Massachusetts." Later, he realizes
that he mistakenly sent the money to the Basketball Hall of Fame in
Springfield, Massachusetts, instead of the Baseball Hall of Fame in
Cooperstown, New York. Paul sues the Basketball Hall of Fame
seeking return of the money.
Each of Cases One, Two, and Three falls only within one of the
established branches of substantive private law.
Case One falls squarely and solely within the substantive law of
tort. Debbie unjustifiably caused injury to Paul, and Paul seeks
5. I use currency in the example because if I used a more plausible
example of donation by check the issues would be complicated by the possibility
of actions based on the law of the check system.
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compensation for that injury. No one would be confused into
thinking that Paul's action against Debbie has anything to do with
any promise or with any notion of unjust enrichment.
Case Two falls squarely and solely within the substantive law of
contract. Debbie made a promise to Paul and unjustifiably refused
to perform that promise. Paul sues seeking a remedy that will place
him in the position he would have been in if Debbie had performed
her promise. No one would be confused into thinking that Paul's
action against Debbie has anything to do with harm suffered by
Paul or with any notion of unjust enrichment.
Case Three falls squarely and solely within the substantive law
of restitution. Paul conferred a benefit upon the Basketball Hall of
:Fame and did so simply as a result of a mistake. There is no reason
that the Basketball Hall of Fame should retain that benefit. Now,
in fact, lawyers are likely to be confused about this; but no well-
trained lawyer should be confused about it. Paul is entitled to
judgment for $250,000 from the Basketball Hall of Fame. That has
been settled law since at least the middle of the seventeenth
century.6 For some reason, however, there never cease to be news
stories on some version of this scenario, presenting it as though it
were a novel problem.7 It is not. It's about as simple a case as one
6. E.g., Bonnel v. Foulke, (1657) 82 Eng. Rep. 1224, 1224 (KB.) ("Come si
un vient a moy & dit, Pay me my rent, I am your landlord, & jeo respond give
me your receipt and you shall have it & issint jeo ceo pay, & puis un auter q
droit ad vient & demand & jeo luy pay, jeo poy aver indebitatus assumpsit vers
il q done a moy Ie primer receipt.").
7. E.g., Associated Press, Cubs' Payroll Goof Gives Carrier $301,000;
Tribune Co. Sues to Recover Money Intended for Relief Pitcher, Sept.
10, 2004, available at http://sports-boards.netlforums/showthread.php?
t=1858.
MIDDLETOWN, Conn.-The company that owns the Chicago Cubs
and The Hartford Courant are battling a former newspaper carrier to
get back the last of $301,000 it accidentally gave to him instead of a
baseball player with the same name.
The Tribune Co. money that was meant for Mark Guthrie, the
relief pitcher, was sent to the bank account of Mark Guthrie, the
Courant deliveryman, in three payments, the final one made last
October. Five weeks later the Cubs realized the error, and the team
took back $275,000 before Guthrie froze his account.
The Cubs sued in February but last month filed legal documents
offering to drop the suit ifhe handed over the final $26,000.
"We have no desire to embarrass Mr. Guthrie or bring undue
attention to his actions-we just want the money back," said attorney
Paul Guggina, who is representing the Cubs.
Guthrie, 43, said the matter is more complicated.
"I need them to open the books to me and show me I don't have
any tax liabilities," he said. "It's mind-boggling. They never should
have made the mistake to begin with."
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can imagine for the substantive law of restitution. Paul's right to
recover has nothing to do with any bad action by the Basketball Hall
of Fame. It doesn't make any difference that Paul may have been
sloppy-"negligent" if one likes fancy lawyer talk.s Nor does Paul's
right against the Basketball Hall of Fame have anything to do with
any promise, explicit or implied, made by the Basketball Hall of
Fame.
Now consider three further scenarios, where the substantive
law of restitution overlaps with one or more of the other two
branches.
Case Four. Debbie goes to Dr. Paul for dental treatment.
Nothing is said about the charge. Dr. Paul sends Debbie a bill for
$75, his customary charge for the work. Debbie refuses to pay. Dr.
Paul sues Debbie.
Case Five. Debbie steals $1000 from Paul. Paul sues Debbie for
$1000.
Case Six. Debbie goes to Chez Paul, a fancy restaurant. She
orders a meal from the menu and eats it. After dessert, she looks
around the dining room carefully, discovers that none of the waiters
are present, and runs out of the restaurant without paying the bill.
Chez Paul sues Debbie for the price of the meal.
Case Four illustrates the overlap of contract and restitution.
The case might be regarded as falling within the law of contract, in
the usual sense of enforcing promises. Debbie's action of going to
Dr. Paul's office and requesting and receiving treatment can be
treated as a manifestation of assent to pay Dr. Paul the $75
customary charge for the work. Suppose Debbie was an odd sort of
person-perhaps a lawyer-who said, "I offer to pay you $75 if you
clean my teeth. You may signify your acceptance of this offer by
performing the work." We could then say that Dr. Paul has an
action against Debbie because she made an offer, the offer was
accepted, and performance was rendered. Accordingly, she is
obligated to place Dr. Paul in the position he would have been in if
she had performed her promise. Or, suppose the same facts, except
The carrier said he had waited for the team to call him as his
bank account ballooned.
Guthrie the pitcher, 38, is now a free agent.
8. See, e.g., Bank of Naperville v. Catalano, 408 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980):
As a general rule, where money is paid under a mistake of fact,
and payment would not have been made had the facts been known to
the payor, such money may be recovered. The fact that the person to
whom the money was paid under a mistake of fact was not guilty of
deceit or unfairness, and acted in good faith, does not prevent recovery
of the sum paid, nor does the negligence of the payor preclude
recovery.
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that Debbie says, "I offer to pay you your usual fee if you clean my
teeth." Again, we could say that her liability is based on her
promise. But there really is no need to haul out all the conceptual
machinery of contract law for this simple case. She got her teeth
cleaned, so she has to pay. The substantive law of restitution
provides an easy way to describe her obligation. Dr. Paul conferred
a benefit upon Debbie by performing the work. Dr. Paul did so in
circumstances where payment is routinely required. Accordingly, it
would be inappropriate for Debbie to retain the benefit of the
services without paying for them.
To see the restitution perspective even more clearly, one need
only change the facts of Case Four slightly to suppose that Dr. Paul
is a physician who performs emergency services for Debbie when she
is lying unconscious after an accident. Though the services are
competently performed, Debbie does not survive. Dr. Paul seeks
payment for his customary charge from Debbie's estate. It has been
settled for years that the doctor would win the case.9 The simple
explanation is provided by the substantive law of restitution. The
doctor is entitled to recover for the reasonable value of the benefit
conferred by providing the services. It makes no difference whether
one could find some basis for construing any action by Debbie as
tantamount to making a promise. Nonetheless, confusion about the
relationship between contract and restitution has sometimes led
lawyers representing the patient's estate in such cases to waste
their client's money by trying to show that the patient never
regained consciousness and so could not have manifested assent. 10
Case Five illustrates the overlap of tort and restitution. One
might think of this as a case where Debbie inflicted a harm on Paul
by depriving him of $1000, and so she must compensate him for the
harm he suffered. Or, one might think of this as a case where
Debbie inappropriately obtained a benefit from Paul by taking the
$1000 from him, and so she owes a duty to disgorge the enrichment
she obtained. In a simple case, it really doesn't matter which way
we describe the case. We get into troubles only if we get caught up
in arcane jargon and start talking about the restitution action as
one in which Paul "waives the tort and sues in assumpsit."u
9. See, e.g., Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907).
10. [d. at 165 (dismissing as silly the argument of the patient's lawyer that
the patient "was never conscious after his head struck the pavement. He did
not and could not, expressly or impliedly, assent to the action of the appellees.
He was without knowledge or will power.").
11. See 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION § 2.1 (1978) ("The
expression 'waiver of tort' is inaccurate; it has been a source of confusion and
sometimes of unsatisfactory decisions ... it should be wholly discarded.").
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Case Six illustrates the overlap of tort, contract, and restitution.
There is no question that Debbie is obligated to Chez Paul for the
cost of the meal. We can describe that obligation in various ways.
We might say that by sitting down in the restaurant, ordering from
the menu, and eating the meal, Debbie manifested that she
promised to pay Chez Paul the price of the meal. Or, we could say
that what Debbie did was equivalent to stealing from Chez Paul,
and she is obligated to pay damages for the harm she inflicted. Or,
we could say that Debbie enriched herself by eating the meal, so she
is obligated to disgorge the enrichment she received. 12
The irony is that despite the fact that this is all very simple,
many lawyers thinking about these six examples will feel entirely
comfortable with the tort and contract cases and will feel
comfortable with the overlap cases, so long as they are described
from the perspective of tort or contract. By contrast, the restitution
approach, either in the case of payment by mistake where
restitution is the only plausible approach, or in any of the overlap
cases, is likely to leave lawyers feeling a bit uneasy. It's pretty
common to hear law students and lawyers say something along the
lines of: "I more or less understood contracts and torts, but 1 never
really understood that stuff about quasi-contract or restitution."
That, 1 suspect, is the product of little more than the way we
organize the first-year curriculum in law school.
Suppose that in the first year of law school we taught tort and
restitution but not contract. Students would emerge saying that
they more or less understood the subjects they took, but never felt
comfortable about that other odd subject. We would have people
saying things like: "I understood tort and restitution, but in our
restitution class we sometimes encountered quasi-restitution and
that always confused me. 1 understand that you have to pay for
stuff that you get. So all the stuff about sale of goods and sale of
real estate was pretty simple. You owe a duty of restitution for the
benefit that you received. But sometimes you have to pay even
though all that happened was that you made a deal, and then
nothing ever happened. 1 don't see how you could say that anyone
was enriched if neither side performed. But somehow people did
win those cases, on the notion of "quasi-restitution." 1 guess the
idea was that simply by making a deal you were sometimes
"enriched," in a way, if the deal was one that would turn out to be a
good one. And so, 1 suppose, maybe you could say that you were
entitled to that enrichment just by virtue of making the deal, so that
if the other side refused to perform, you were entitled to sue in
quasi-restitution for the benefit that you should have received. But
12. Maybe I should not talk about disgorging meals.
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anyway, it sure was confusing, and I hope there's not much of it on
the bar exam."
If we taught restitution and contract but not tort, we'd end up
with law students and lawyers similarly confused about those weird
quasi-restitution cases where sometimes you had to pay just because
somebody else got hurt, even though you didn't make any promise or
obtain any enrichment.
II. IS RESTITUTION PARASITIC?
There is not much point in talking about which branches of law
are basic and which are odd. If history had unfolded in a different
way, restitution might occupy a more prominent place in the
organization of law and law school curricula, but that is not the way
that things happened. Counter-factual history is sometimes fun-
what if the South had won the Civil War?-but it's not a subject to
be pursued all that seriously. But there is a danger in confusing
accidental products of history with coherent logical explanations. It
will undoubtedly remain the case for the foreseeable future that
contract and tort will occupy center stage and restitution will lurk in
the wings. But, when our subject matter is the law of restitution,
we should not be so modest. The thesis of this Article is that on the
topic of restitution for wrongful conduct, it is not helpful to think
that the law of tort is the natural source of judgments about what is
rightful and what is wrongful. That is, the contribution of the law of
restitution in that area is more than to provide an additional
remedy for conduct that is judged wrongful under the law of tort or
other law.
The black-letter text of the current proposed Restatement might
be read as neutral on the question whether restitution is an
independent basis of liability. Section 40 provides for restitution of
benefits obtained "by an act of trespass or conversion," which seems
to limit restitution recovery to cases where the conduct is tortious
under other law. The other provisions in the chapter on restitution
for wrongs are a bit more open-textured. Section 41 provides for
restitution of benefits obtained "by misappropriation of financial
assets." Section 42 provides for restitution of benefits obtained "by
misappropriation or infringement of another's legally protected
rights in any idea, expression, information, image, or designation."
Section 43 provides for restitution of benefits obtained "in breach of
a fiduciary duty." Finally, Section 44 provides a residual rule
authorizing restitution of benefits obtained by "conscious
interference with another's legally protected interests." Focusing on
the general formulation found in Section 44, one might read the
language as meaning that the unjust enrichment principle may
itself be the basis for determining that the conduct does constitute
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an interference with "legally protected interests."
The official comments and reporter's notes, however, are very
clear in stating that the determination of rightful versus wrongful
conduct is to be based solely on other law; that is, the unjust
enrichment principle plays no independent substantive role. The
comment to Section 44 provides, "Restitution by the rule of this
Section will sometimes yield a recovery where the claimant could
not prove damages, but it does not create a cause of action where the
claimant would otherwise have none.,,13
Similar passages appear in the comments to other sections
within this Chapter. For example, the comment to Section 42, on
interference with intellectual property rights, states that:
The rights referred to in this Section, and the acts constituting
a prohibited interference therewith, are defined by state and
federal law outside the scope of this Restatement.... The law
of restitution does not define the substantive rules of
ownership on which a claim for infringement or
misappropriation necessarily rests. The rule of this Section
depends on a body of law that defines the underlying
entitlements, just as the rule of § 40 (describing restitution for
trespass or conversion) depends on a body of law that defines
ownership rights in tangible property.14
The Reporter made the point quite clearly at the May 2005
American Law Institute meeting where this Chapter was discussed:
The uniform assumption throughout all of these Sections, §§
40 through 44, is that the boundary line between what's mine
and what's yours is fixed by other law.... We are certainly not
trying to restate what acts constitute infringement of a patent,
a copyright, or a trademark in this Section, nor whether in a
particular jurisdiction there is such a thing as a right of
publicity, or, if there is, what its contours might be. Nor, just
to continue with this theme, because it is very important,
when we get to § 43, are we trying to restate the underlying
law of fiduciary obligation, to state whether, under given
circumstances, a particular action or inaction gives rise to a
fiduciary duty and, if it does, whether it has been breached;
nor, finally, last but not least, in § 44 are we creating any new
causes of action. We make it explicit that we are not. 15
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44
cmt. a, at 153 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
14. Id. § 42 cmts. a & b, at 85, 87.
15. Andrew Kull, Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution
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To some extent, the position taken by the Reporter is clearly
correct. As a matter of the organization and scope of the project, it
would make no sense to attempt in the Restatement of Restitution a
comprehensive statement of all of the related bodies of law that
define wrongful conduct. That, however, is different from saying, as
the current draft does, that the law of restitution plays no role in
defining wrongful conduct. In some areas, particularly areas where
the judgments of other law about rightful and wrongful conduct are
not entirely clear, it is the thesis of this Article that the law of
restitution does and should play an important substantive role.
It is also important to distinguish the thesis of this Article from
a point that Professor Kull accurately, though provocatively,
describes as "arid": that is, whether in general the law of restitution
should be described as substantive or remedial. I6 Let us, for the
moment, confine our attention to simple examples in the area of
restitution for wrongful conduct, such as an action for taking of
another's tangible personal pro-perty. Consider, for example, the
scenario given as an illustration in Section 40 of the current draft of
the Restatement, where Owner brings an action against Dealer who
has purchased and resold Owner's stolen car. l7 The point of Section
40 is that, at least where Dealer acted as a conscious wrongdoer,
Owner can recover the amount of the resale-$20,000 in the
illustration-even if the value of the car at the time of the theft was
only $18,000. The tort law of conversion would presumably measure
the recovery by the amount of harm suffered by the Owner; that is,
the loss of the $18,000 value of the car. The law of restitution seeks
to prevent Dealer from profiting by the wrongful conduct, and so
dealer must disgorge the $20,000 benefit obtained by the wrongful
sale of Owner's car.
The controversy that Professor Kull aptly describes as "arid" is
as follows: Should Owner's cause of action for $20,000 be described
as based on the substantive law of tort, with the law of restitution
providing only a different calculation of the remedy? Or, should
Owner's cause of action for $20,000 be described as based on the law
of restitution? It is entirely true that, in such a case, nothing of
substance turns on the resolution of the dispute. It is, as Professor
Kull correctly notes, a dispute about the table of contents of books
rather than the content of the books. IS If I understand him correctly,
and Unjust Enrichment, 82 A.L.I. PROC. 249, 287 (2006).
16. See id.
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
cmt. d, illus. 13, at 56 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
18. Kull, supra note 15, at 273 ("My own view is that ultimately it depends
on how you look at it, and it really doesn't matter because we're just arguing
 2007] RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS 65
Professor Kull takes the view that it is simpler to describe the law of
restitution in this and other areas as providing a cause of action, but
whether that cause of action exists or not depends on other law-the
law of conversion in the example here under consideration.
But the controversy seems arid only if we confine our attention
to simple examples. Suppose I devise a machine that will
dematerialize the protons, neutrons, and electrons from the watch
on your wrist and reform them into a watch on my wrist. Is that a
conversion? I don't think there is much doubt about how a court
would resolve such a case. I have no doubt that a court would
conclude that my conduct was wrongful. It is possible that the court
might justify that conclusion by drawing on principles solely within
the law of tort, such as by emphasizing the circumstance that my
machine caused the watch on your wrist to dematerialize, thereby
harming you. But, I think it is equally plausible to suppose that the
court would say that whatever conclusion one might reach as a
matter of the tort law of conversion, it is simply not appropriate for
me to enrich myself at your expense. Accordingly, you should have a
cause of action based on the unjust enrichment principle, whether or
not you would have a cause of action in conversion. It strikes me as
quite unhelpful to insist, as the current draft of the Restatement
does, that any such conclusion would have to be based on law other
than the law of restitution.
It is worth contrasting the approach taken to restitution for
wrongs with the approach taken in another section of the proposed
Restatement, Section 39 on profit derived from opportunistic breach
of contract. 19 Under Section 39, there may be cases in which a party
who profits by a breach of a contract owes a duty of restitution of
those profits, even though the amount of the profits exceeds the
usual contract remedy of the amount needed to place the non-
breaching party where she would have been if the agreement had
been performed. On a certain view of substantive contract law and
contract remedies-the view associated with the concept of "efficient
breach,,2°-that rule is anomalous in the extreme. On that view, all
that it means to say that a person is bound by a contract is that the
about how to write the Table of Contents for some book, in this case the
Restatement. Personally, I am satisfied that it is simpler to describe
overlapping liabilities than to say that part of the law of restitution confers a
substantive cause of action, while another part of this curious subject is simply
an additional remedy to be brought out where you have a tort or a contract
claim.").
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
20. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
29-32 (1983).
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person must either perform or pay damages to place the non-
breaching party in the position she would have occupied if the
promise had been performed.21 If the circumstances are such that
one side might be better off breaching and paying damages, then
that is just what that party ought to do. Yet, Section 39 of the
Restatement of Restitution says that, albeit in carefully limited
extreme cases, a party who profits by breach may owe a duty of
restitution. As the Reporter has noted, that rule is clearly in tension
with the efficient breach hypothesis,22 yet, as the Reporter has also
noted, the cases do support recovery in some such situations.23
The substantive approach taken in Section 39 of the proposed
Restatement has been widely applauded.24 That is a view that I
share. Moreover, as a matter of organization, it makes sense to deal
with the issue within the Restatement of Restitution, rather than
treating it as solely a matter of the law of contract. Treating this
openly as an issue within the law of restitution facilitates
comparisons to other instances of unjust enrichment and makes it
clear that restitution principles must be developed with sensitivity
both to other restitution issues and to issues normally regarded as
solely within the sphere of contract law. On balance, the law is
better if it is openly acknowledged that in some extreme cases a
person ought not be able to profit from breach of contract, even if
that notion is in tension with much of what underlies contract law.
The thesis of this Article is that the same view ought be taken in the
area of restitution for wrongs. To be sure, in most of the territory
within this subject, the dividing line between rightful and wrongful
conduct is and should be drawn on the basis of the law particular to
the species of wrongful conduct. However, in at least some cases, it
is useful to look to the law of restitution itself for guidance on
drawing that line.
21. As Holmes famously stated, "The duty to keep a contract ... means a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else."
O.W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 lIARv. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
22. Kull, supra note 15, at 257-58.
23. [d. at 250-53.
24. [d. at 256 (Professor Laycock: "enormous accomplishment"); id. at 257
(Justice Kass: "admirable"); id. at 259 (Professor Kovacic-Fleischer: "I would
also like to second the other speakers who have complimented you on this
Section"); id. at 262 (Professor Cohen: "the Section ... is well deserving of all
the praise that's been thrown your way"); id. at 266 (Professor Young: "Like
some others who spoke, 1 am a warm admirer of this Section").
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III. INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS THAT ARE
PROTECTED By OTHER LAw
It is certainly true that in many instances the role of the law of
restitution is to provide a basis for recovery for acts that are fairly
clearly described as wrongful by other law. In many such cases,
plaintiff would have a cause of action under other law, so that
recovery based on the unjust enrichment principle can with equal
plausibility be regarded as providing a remedy for a wrong described
by other law or as providing a cause of action, though one that is
"parasitic" on other law for the basic judgment of right and wrong.
In some cases within this general category, the law of
restitution provides a basis of recovery where other law has, often
for little good reason, created an obstacle to recovery. A classic
instance is provided by Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball,25 in which a
coal company held an easement entitling it to transport coal mined
from certain property via a tramway constructed over plaintiffs
land. Plaintiff sued for overuse of the easement when it discovered
that the coal company had also used the tramway to transport coal
from other land not within the scope of the easement. The tort
principle that one must compensate for harm done provides little
help in such cases, for it would have been hard for plaintiff to show
that it had suffered any actual, measurable harm from overuse of
the easement. On the other hand, simple property concepts suffice
to label defendant's act wrongful. It is basic to our conception of
property that ownership of land includes the right to exclude others.
Defendant had contracted for the right to transport certain coal over
plaintiffs land. Any further use was wrongful, that is, amounted to
a trespass. There are various ways that one might compute the
remedy for that trespass. To be sure, plaintiff would be entitled to
compensation for any actual harm sustained, but in the case itself
that would presumably have generated no recovery. Granting
restitution for the value of the benefit obtained provides a useful
way of vindicating simple property notions.
The restitution action on the facts of Raven Red Ash
encountered a historical difficulty. The approach taken in the
English case of Phillips v. Homfral6 would have denied recovery on
the ground that merely using another's land, without removing
anything of value from it, constituted only a tort. Raven Red Ash
rejected that approach, holding that plaintiff could bring a
restitution action to recover the saved expense, or as it was put at
the time, plaintiff could "waive the tort and sue in assumpsit." The
25. 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946).
26. (1883) 24 Ch.D. 439 (C.A.).
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original Restatement of Restitution accepted the older view that
denied recovery in such cases. 27 The current draft of the
Restatement appropriately adopts the approach taken in Raven Red
Ash.28
As is the case with real property, a person who wrongfully uses
personal property should have a duty to make restitution for any
benefit obtained. The current draft of the Restatement describes the
basic principle as follows: "A person who obtains a benefit by an act
of trespass or conversion . . . is accountable to the victim of the
wrong for the benefit so obtained.,,29 There is a problem with that
formulation. As currently drafted, there is an action for restitution
only if there would be an action for trespass or conversion. That
formulation confuses the substantive law of personal property with
the remedial law of tort. The thought presumably is that recovery is
warranted any time that the substantive law of personal property
recognizes that a person has the right to exclude another from use of
certain personal property and another person obtains a benefit by
interfering with that right. The key step in that inquiry is whether
the law of personal property does or does not give plaintiff a right to
exclude defendant from the use in question. It is, however, a
different question whether the remedial law of tort would describe
the act in question as a "trespass or conversion."
Consider, for example, John A. Artukovich & Sons, Inc. v.
Reliance Truck Co.30 Artukovich, the owner of a crane, had leased it
to Ashton Company. Ashton hired Reliance to transport the crane
to Ashton's job site. Reliance loaded the crane on its trucks, but
before delivering it to Ashton, Reliance realized that it could use the
crane to fulfill another contract. Reliance contacted Ashton and was
told that permission would have to come from Artukovich. Reliance
attempted without success to contact Artukovich, but went ahead
and used the crane in the other job anyway. Artukovich sued
Reliance for the value of Reliance's use of the crane. The court
stated explicitly that the case presented two issues: (1) whether
Artukovich could recover on a theory of conversion, and (2) whether
Artukovich could recover on an unjust enrichment theory.
27. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 129 (1937). Palmer was harshly critical
of that result. 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 2.5, at 76 ("It is a reproach to the
administration of justice that many courts have adhered to tradition .... [I]f
courts were aware of the fact that the denial of restitution rests wholly upon
obsolete precedent, one who has faith in the judicial process is forced to believe
that the precedent would be discarded.").
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
reporter's note c, at 63 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
29. Id. § 40(1).
30. 614 P.2d 327 (Ariz. 1980).
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Considering first the tort theory, the court held that an action for
wrongful detention of personal property would lie only if plaintiff
then had a legal right to the use of the property. Because
Artukovich had rented the crane to Ashton, it could not satisfy that
requirement, and therefore no tort action would lie.3! Nonetheless,
the court ruled that Artukovich did have a right to recover from
Reliance on a restitution theory. Reliance obtained a benefit from
the unauthorized use of Artukovich's crane, and was required to
make restitution for the value of that benefit, whether or not
Artukovich could show that it suffered any loss. The case could not
be any clearer on the point that the availability of the restitution
action does not depend on whether plaintiff would have had an
action under the law oftort for conversion or trespass.32
If taken literally, the current Restatement draft would seem to
say that plaintiff in Artukovich would not have a restitution action,
because plaintiff would not have a tort action.33 The problem could
easily be fixed by returning to a formulation used in an earlier draft
under which the restitution action would be available for an
"interference with legally-protected rights in tangible property.,,34
The problem with the current draft is that the restitution action is
tied too closely to the tort action for conversion. But either form of
action has as its objective vindication oflegal interests that are well-
established under the law of property. The crane belonged to
Artukovich. That meant that Artukovich alone was entitled to
permit or prohibit others from using it. Reliance used it without
31. Id. at 329 ("Since Ashton had taken possession of the crane by
authorizing its agent, Reliance, to transport the crane to Tucson, plaintiff,
Artukovich, no longer had any right to use nor was it in a position to use the
crane at the time of Reliance's unauthorized use. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot
recover damages for its loss of use of the crane on a theory of conversion.").
32. Professor Friedmann has discussed in detail situations where
restitution has been and should be granted when a person obtains a benefit by
infringement of another's interest in personal property, yet the act does not
constitute the tort of trespass or conversion. Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of
Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation ofProperty or the Commission ofa
Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 532-51 (1980).
33. Or, perhaps the conclusion would only be that plaintiffs restitution
action falls within the residual category described in Section 44, rather than the
category of restitution of benefits obtained by trespass or conversion covered by
Section 40. The current draft, however, treats Artukovich as a Section 40 case.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
reporter's note d, at 66 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005). Moving the cases of
unauthorized use of chattels not involving a technical trespass or conversion
from Section 40 to Section 44 seems inappropriate, inasmuch as the latter
section is much more restrictive of liability than Section 40.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
(Preliminary Draft No.6, 2004).
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obtaining Artukovich's consent, and that use was clearly a violation
of Artukovich's property rights.
IV. COMPUTATION OF RESTITUTION RECOVERY FOR INFRINGEMENT
OF RECOGNIZED PROPERTY INTERESTS
Continuing to focus on areas where other law does quite clearly
mark the line between rightful conduct and wrongful conduct, it is
worth pausing for a moment to consider how one should determine
the extent of restitution recovery. Under the current draft of the
Restatement, such issues depend primarily on the distinction
between conscious and innocent wrongdoing. As Section 40 puts it:
(a) A conscious wrongdoer ... will be required to disgorge all
gains (including consequential gains) derived from the
wrongful transaction.
(b) A person whose conduct is innocent or merely negligent
will be liable only for the direct benefit derived from the
wrongful transaction. Direct benefit may be measured, where
such a measurement is available and appropriate, by
reasonable rental value or by the reasonable cost of a license.35
The distinction between conscious and unconscious wrongdoing
may help in some cases, but it does not seem to account fully for our
intuitions about the appropriate measure of recovery. It is one thing
to say that an unconscious wrongdoer should not be required to
disgorge all profits made from what turned out to have been a
wrongful use of another's property. It is another thing to say that
any conscious wrongdoer should be required to disgorge all profits.
There are simply some cases in which that recovery seems far too
harsh. There may, however, be more that can be said about why it
sometimes does seem appropriate to require a conscious wrongdoer
to disgorge profits.
Consider the classic Great Onyx Cave case, Edwards u. Lee's
Administrator.36 The owner of land discovered that it contained the
entrance to a magnificent limestone cave and developed the cave as
a tourist attraction. The owner of adjacent land brought suit when
he realized that the tours included portions of the cave system that
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40(2)
(Tentative Draft No.4, 2005). A similar formulation appears in Sections 41, 42,
and 43.
36. 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936). One of the highlights of the current
Restatement of Restitution project was a "field trip" for the advisers and
members consultative group to the actual cave, now a part of Mammoth Cave
National Park. See 27 A.L.I. REP., Fall 2004, at 1-2.
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lay beneath his land. It would have been difficult to identify any
actual harm suffered by plaintiff. Having no means of access to the
cave system from his land, plaintiff could never have developed it as
an attraction. Yet given our system of property law, defendant's
exploitation of the portions of the cave under plaintiffs land
constituted a trespass. The problem is to decide how one should
compute the restitution recovery. In the case itself, the court ruled
that plaintiff was entitled to recover a portion of defendant's profits
from the venture, the proportion being computed on the basis of the
square footage of the cave under each party's land. The current
draft of the Restatement approves of that result and bases it on the
distinction between conscious and innocent wrongdoing.37
The result in the Great Onyx Cave case has long been regarded
as somewhat troubling. Professor Prosser thought the result foolish:
"Since it is quite apparent that [plaintift] had no slightest practical
possibility of access to the cave ... the decision is dog-in-the-manger
law, and can only be characterized as a very bad one.,,38 Others are
willing to accept the substantive result that some recovery was
warranted, but are troubled by the extent of the recovery. Dawson
noted that the "formula may have taken insufficient account of the
defendant's contribution as entrepreneur and the fact that only he
could supply an entrance.,,39 Similarly, Palmer suggests that while
"[i]t is fair to deprive a willful wrongdoer of all profit ... the
Edwards case goes beyond this since no allowance was made for the
defendant's contributions to the creation of that profit.',4O
The key to the approach in the Great Onyx Cave case may lie
not merely in the rough distinction between conscious wrongdoers
and others, but in the way that defendant's conduct affected our
ability to decide what would otherwise constitute a fair price for the
use wrongfully taken. If there had been an established market price
for the right to exhibit portions of a cave under the land of an owner
who had no means of surface access, one would imagine that market
would furnish an appropriate measure of recovery, as in the Raven
Red Ash case. But in the Great Onyx Cave case, defendant's
wrongful conduct prevented the operation of the only fair means of
setting a price for the use of the property.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
cmt. c, illus. 4 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
38. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 73 (4th
ed. 1971); see also Recent Decisions, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 504 (1937) (calling
the Great Onyx Cave case an "astonishing result").
39. John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. 563,
613 n.158 (1981).
40. 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 2.12, at 163.
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Suppose that the cave features that warranted commercial
development had been located under plaintiffs land, but that the
only access to the cave was on defendant's land. If defendant had
acted honestly, it would have gone to plaintiff and bought the right
to enter plaintiffs land and exhibit the cave features. What would
an appropriate price have been? It makes no sense to say that the
appropriate price is the "fair market value," for the situation is too
specialized for there to be anything that one can honestly call a fair
market price. But, consider for a moment. All that we mean by
"fair market price" is the price that would be produced by
negotiation between a large number of willing buyers and willing
sellers of similar property. In a situation like the Great Onyx Cave
case, there really is no market, so "fair price" means simply the price
that is agreed to by this particular seller and this particular buyer.
Now shift to the situation presented in the case itself.
Defendant did not bargain with plaintiff. Rather, defendant simply
took the use of plaintiffs property,41 circumventing the negotiation
that is the only way of setting the fair price for such an unusual
right. The wrong was not only the taking of the use of property, but
also the taking of the only fair way of measuring the value of that
use.
42 In that situation, there is something to be said for adopting a
measure of recovery that probably does exceed the likely outcome of
the bargaining.
There may be yet another aspect of wrongful taking that
warrants a rather generous measure of recovery in certain cases.
Consider the well-known egg-washing machine case, Olwell v. Nye
& Nissen CO. 43 Plaintiff and defendant had been co-owners of an egg
business. In 1940, plaintiff sold his interest in the business to
defendant. Not included in the sale, however, was an egg-washing
machine. Plaintiff retained ownership of the machine and stored it
on an adjacent property. Sometime thereafter, defendant, without
41. Cf. BEATRIX POTIER, THE STORY OF A FIERCE BAD RABBIT 8 (1906) ("He
doesn't say 'Please.' He takes it!").
42. Professor Kull hints at this aspect of the case in one passage of the
commentary to the current Restatement draft:
The more difficult issues of valuation are accordingly those in
which the defendant has made a use of the claimant's property for
which there is no ordinary market; or in which the defendant has
bypassed any market by taking without asking, or by proceeding in
the face of a refusal.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 cmt. b, at
48 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
43. 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946). In the years I taught a Restitution course, I
assembled a marvelous collection of students' imaginative responses to the
following take-home exam question: "Special Question (No credit, but much
appreciation!) Draw and/or describe an egg-washing machine."
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discussion or consent, took the machine out of storage and used it
about once a week for three years. Plaintiff then discovered the use
and offered to sell the machine to defendant for $600, about one-half
of its original cost. Defendant's counter-offer of $50 was refused,
and plaintiff brought suit.
Plaintiff would certainly have had an action for conversion, but
the maximum recovery would presumably have been the value of
the machine. Given that plaintiff had offered to sell it for $600, that
would presumably have been the maximum amount of the recovery.
Instead, plaintiff sued for restitution of the benefit defendant
obtained by the wrongful use of the machine. As evidence of the
value of that benefit, plaintiff proved that defendant had saved the
labor expense of washing eggs by hand, amounting to about $10 per
day. Over the three-year period for which damages were assessed,
that amounted to $1560. The Washington Supreme Court held that
this was an appropriate case for restitutionary recovery, and that
the saved labor expense was an appropriate measure of the benefit
wrongfully obtained by defendant's use of the machine. Ironically,
however, the amount that plaintiff would have been entitled to was
less than the ad damnum in plaintiffs complaint, only $25 per
month. So, the recovery was reduced to the $900 amount sought in
the complaint.
The striking thing about the case is that, had it not been for the
pleading mistake, the court would apparently have been willing to
grant damages measured by the saved labor costs of $1560 even
though plaintiff had offered to sell the machine for $600. The
decision has been criticized as awarding an overly generous measure
of recovery. The current Restatement draft more or less accepts the
result in an illustration, but bases that conclusion on the distinction
between conscious and innocent conversion and the fact that
defendant had refused plaintiffs offer to sell the machine.44 Others
are more critical. Palmer noted that the wrongfulness of
defendant's conduct is relevant, but concluded that "[a] recovery
that departs this far from market standards is at least suspect.,,45
Dawson was even more critical, noting that "[t]here must be
something incurably wrong about this.,,46
There may, however, be more to the matter than first meets the
eye. If using the machine was so obviously profitable, why didn't
defendant buy it along with the rest of the egg-washing business?
Why did plaintiff keep it, squirreled away in storage collecting dust?
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
cmt. d, illus. 16 at 58-59 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
45. 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 2.12, at 161.
46. Dawson, supra note 39, at 612.
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The case does not permit any confident conclusions, but offers
tantalizing clues. Plaintiff bought the machine in 1929. Plaintiff
sold his interest in the egg business in 1940, and, at that time,
defendant apparently had no interest in the machine. Defendant,
however, began using the machine on May 31, 1941. As the court
notes explicitly, the reason was "the scarcity of labor immediately
after the outbreak of the war.,,47 The picture one gets is that
plaintiff may well have been a tinkerer, or a dreamer, who, in 1929,
thought that the egg-washing machine was a great idea. Defendant
may well have been the more hard-nosed practical sort, who thought
it silly to spend money on a fancy machine when you could hire
people more cheaply to wash the eggs by hand. But, with the
dramatic rise in labor prices due to the outbreak of World War Two,
the choice between machine washing and hand washing looked very
different.
Consider in this regard the classic children's story of the three
little pigs.48 Pig One quickly built his house with straw and spent
his time playing the flute. Pig Two spent a bit more time building
his house with sticks, but then joined the fun, playing the fiddle.
Pig Three was the practical, nay boring, drudge. He labored
endlessly building a strong house of bricks, deferring his
gratification of playing the piano until his work was done. When the
big bad wolf came, he easily blew down Pig One's house and Pig
Two's house. Fortunately for them, Pig Three let them take refuge
in his strong house, where all were saved from the wolf.49
Now, suppose that Pig Three had been away when the big bad
wolf came. Suppose that Pig One and Pig Two escaped from the
wolf, ran to Pig Three's house, found that he wasn't home, but
entered anyway taking refuge from the wolf. Later Pig Three
discovered what happened and sued Pig One and Pig Two for
unlawfully making use of his house. What would the recovery be?
Pig One and Pig Two may have been guilty of a trespass, but a
trespass action would presumably give Pig Three only nominal
damages. At the other extreme, one might say that the value of the
refuge that the first two pigs took was saving their lives, and since
Pig One and Pig Two would presumably value their lives above all
else, Pig Three should be able to collect essentially infinite damages
47. Olwell, 173 P.2d at 652-53.
48. I use the Disney version of the classic folk tale. THREE LITTLE PIGS
(Walt Disney 1933).
49. Needless to say, the Disney version cleaned up the story a good deal. In
prior versions, the first two little pigs were eaten by the wolf. See Wikipedia,
Three Little Pigs, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikifI'hree_little_pigs (last visited Jan.
21,2007).
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from them. Neither approach accurately captures the situation. Pig
One and Pig Two got to sing and dance all day while Pig Three
slaved away building his house. Then, when the big bad wolf came
by, Pig One and Pig Two took advantage of Pig Three's work and
sheltered themselves in his strong house. In short, Pig One and Pig
Two appropriated to themselves the value of Pig Three's investment
in a strong house.
Consider another casebook classic, the tort case of Ploof v.
Putnam. 50 Putnam owned an island in Lake Champlain. Seeking
safety during a sudden violent storm, Ploof moored his boot on
Putnam's dock. Putnam's servant unmoored the sloop. As a result,
the boat was destroyed in the storm, and Ploof and his family
suffered injuries. The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that Ploof
could recover for the damages suffered on the grounds that the
sudden necessity privileged the temporary use of Putnam's property,
so that casting off Ploofs boat was wrongful. Now consider a
variant. Suppose that the dock owner had not cast off the boat, but
sued for the trespass. At most, there would have been a technical
trespass, with recovery of nominal damages. Indeed, the result in
the case suggests that the temporary use would not have even been
a trespass, so no recovery would have been allowed.
Now consider a further variant. Suppose that Ploof and
Putnam own adjacent waterfront parcels. Putnam, a crusty old
Vermonter, spends considerable time and effort maintaining his
dock. Ploof, a carefree New Yorker who only summers in Vermont,
allows his dock to deteriorate. Putnam often warns Ploof that his
dock is falling into disrepair, but Ploof is too interested in his sailing
parties to waste time fixing up the dock. As is no surprise to
Putnam, Ploofs dock is destroyed in a violent storm. Ploof runs out
and moors his fancy sailboat to Putnam's dock. What result if
Putnam sues Ploof? Would we be willing to say that the emergency
created by the storm gives Ploof a privilege to make use of Putnam's
dock? Even if not, would we be willing to say that Putnam can
recover only nominal damages for the trespass? The problem, as in
the three little pigs hypothetical, is that one party has obtained the
benefit of another's prudent investment. Qualitatively, we can see
that Ploof has reaped the advantage of the Putnam's prudent
expenditure on measures that might prevent or alleviate future
harm. Quantitatively, it is extremely difficult to put a figure on the
value of that benefit.
So, let us reconsider the Olwell case. Plaintiff invested in the
egg-washing machine in 1929, at a time when, presumably, that
seemed a silly thing to do. Once the war broke out and labor prices
50. 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
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skyrocketed, the decision to invest in the egg-washing machine no
longer looked so foolish. When the time came that the investment in
the machine would payoff, defendant just took it. Presumably, if
the war had been of short duration, or if for any other reason labor
prices dropped to their former level, defendant would have stopped
using the machine and gone back to hiring cheap labor. It would
hardly be just to permit defendant to take advantage of plaintiffs
investment. Placing a dollar figure on that benefit is, however,
extraordinarily difficult. It seems highly unlikely that one really
could provide evidence of the reasonable rental value of egg-washing
machines in Tacoma, Washington, in 1941. Any effort to give
content to that notion is likely to end up begging the question. How
should we price the right to use the machine after an unexpected
labor shortage changed foolishness into prescience? Why not simply
say that defendant does not get the advantage of appropriating the
investment? That is exactly the result of the damage calculation
approved by the court.
V. Is RESTITUTION PARASITIC? THE QUESTION REVISITED
In the cases considered thus far, one can always look to the law
of property for a resolution of the basic question whether
defendant's use of plaintiffs property was wrongful. The deeper
question is whether the unjust enrichment principle itself provides a
basis for resolving the question whether use of another's chattels is
wrongful in cases where no clear answer is provided by the remedial
law of tort or the substantive law of property. In considering that
question it is useful to begin with a setting in which the unjust
enrichment principle seems, at first look, to play purely a derivative
role. Consider the delightful old case of Johnson v. Weedman. 51 The
owner of a horse had left it in the care of defendant. Without
authority, defendant rode the horse fifteen miles. As the Illinois
Supreme Court stated, "the horse died within a few hours
afterwards, but not in consequence of the riding.,,52 The horse owner
contended that the unauthorized use amounted to a conversion,
citing a fair number of authorities for the proposition that a use of
personal property by a bailee beyond the terms of the authority
created by the bailment constituted a conversion. The ironic result
of application of that principle would be that the owner could choose
to treat defendant as becoming the owner by virtue of the
conversion, and thereby recover the value of the horse at the time of
the conversion. The fact that the horse died afterwards would then
be defendant's problem. Evidently plaintiffs lawyer had not
51. 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 495 (1843).
52. [d. at 496 (emphasis added).
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counted on the skill of his opponent. As Prosser noted, "a young
lawyer named Abraham Lincoln succeeded in convincing the court
that there was no conversion . . . since [the riding] was not a
sufficiently serious invasion of the owner's rights.,,53 The restitution
angle is provided by the court's suggestion that "[a]nother form of
action would be better adapted to adjust the real rights of the
parties. Peradventure in an action of assumpsit for the use of the
horse, the value of his services might be recovered.,,54 In modern
terminology the thought is that an action for restitution of the value
of the use of the horse for the period it was ridden would yield an
appropriate measure of the benefit wrongfully obtained.
Consider a similar situation, presented by another Illinois
decision a century and a half later. In Schlosser u. Welk,55 a video
store allowed employees to take home videos without charge. An
employee who had been fired discovered, two months later, that she
had taken home eight videos. The former employee returned the
videos, having never viewed them, but the store sued her for the
daily rental fee, amounting to $549. The Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed a judgment for the store on unjust enrichment grounds, but
evidently could not bear to measure the benefit at the daily rate.
The court reduced the judgment to one day's rental fee, nine dollars,
without any particular effort to explain just why that was the
appropriate measure of the benefit.56
In one sense, restitution seems to play purely a derivative role
in both of these cases. No resort to the unjust enrichment principle
is needed to conclude that the action of riding the horse or keeping
the videos was wrongful. Rather, that conclusion is based on simple
concepts of property, contract, and tort. In Johnson u. Weedman,
the horse was the property of plaintiff. The contract between
plaintiff and defendant conferred only limited rights on defendant.
Defendant's use of the horse in excess of authority was tortious. In
Schlosser u. Welk, the videos belonged to the store. The employee's
right to take them came to an end with the termination of her
employment. Her retention of the tapes thereafter was tortious.
In another sense, however, it may be misleading to regard the
unjust enrichment principle as merely derivative, doing nothing
more than providing a method of computing recovery for a wrong
53. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 80. Adding to the irony, the name of the
losing plaintiff was Andrew Johnson.
54. Johnson, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) at 497.
55. 550 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
56. A dissenting judge would have affirmed the full $549 judgment, on the
grounds that the benefit was properly measured by the daily rental fee,
regardless of what the fired employee actually did with the tapes. Id. at 244
(Heiple, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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defined by other law. It is a commonplace that it makes no sense to
speak of a legal right if the law provides no remedy for its violation.57
It is equally true that it makes little sense to identify or classify a
legal right in the abstract without considering in detail what remedy
will be provided for infringement of that right. 58 What does it mean
to say that plaintiff in these cases was the owner of the property and
that defendant's use was tortious? Can we really decide that the use
was tortious without considering what remedy would be provided?
Plaintiffs lawyer in Johnson v. Weedman thought so, but lost that
argument. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that if conversion
meant that plaintiff recovered the value of the horse, then
defendant's acts must not have constituted a conversion. Rather,
the court began with the notion that defendant's wrong was
obtaining the benefit of riding the horse when he had not paid for
that right. In essence, the court concluded that defendant's act
should be regarded in whatever light would produce the result that
defendant was liable only for the value of the use of the horse. In
other words, first one decides how to measure the benefit that
defendant obtained, then one categorizes the conduct in a fashion
that will yield the desired remedy.
So, too, it is hard to account for the result in Schlosser v. Welk
on the assumption that the substantive issue is settled solely by
property or tort law, with restitution simply providing the remedy.
The point that is abundantly clear in Schlosser is that a majority of
the court thought it unfair to allow the owner of the videos to
recover two months' rental price. That was not a remedial
conclusion. Rather, the fact that the employee had not been
unjustly enriched to that extent was the starting point of the
analysis. No characterization of the rights of the owner under
property law or conduct of the employee under the tort law would
have been accepted by the court if the result was liability for two
months'rental.59
57. As Jerome Frank put it:
It is idle chatter to speak of a legal wrong for which there is no
legal redress; a so-called legal right without a legal remedy is ... of no
practical value, being but a shabby mythical entity like the 'grin
without a cat' which Lewis Carroll's Alice, justifiably, could not
understand, for it is comprehensible only to those who dwell in
Wonderland.
Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192, 205 n.37 (2d Cir. 1941).
58. Perhaps the classic example of that point is Lon Fuller's path-breaking
article on the reliance interest in contract law. L.L. Fuller & William R.
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
59. It is also worth noting that in Schlosser it may well have been possible
to reach a satisfying result if the problem had been treated solely under tort
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VI. NO, RESTITUTION Is NOT PARASITIC
SO, we come at last to the main point. In cases where property
or other law does not clearly denominate the conduct in question as
wrongful, does the unjust enrichment principle itself ever call for
recovery? As has been noted, the current draft of the Restatement
emphatically answers no. "Restitution... will sometimes yield a
recovery where the claimant could not prove damages, but it does
not create a cause of action where the claimant would otherwise
have none.,,60 The cases, however, do not really support that
characterization, nor is it consistent with a satisfactory account of
the role of restitution in our legal system.
Consider University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid CO. 61 A pharmaceutical company contacted two
university professors to conduct studies on a vitamin product. The
professors performed the requested study and later performed
several other related studies that they devised themselves. The
results of the various studies were disclosed to the pharmaceutical
company in memoranda that the company agreed to treat as
confidential. The company, however, filed a patent application
based on the professors' work and a patent was issued. Mter
lengthy and complex litigation, the doctors were awarded a sum
designed to measure the incremental increase in profits that the
company had obtained by virtue of the rights it enjoyed under the
patent. The case did not involve the difficult issue of whether state
law rights with respect to claimed inventions are preempted by
federal patent law.62 Rather, the issue was whether the doctors or
the company were entitled to receive the profits derived from the
law. The employee's action of taking the videos and retaining them for a period
of two months would presumably amount to a conversion. 1 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965). Yet that conclusion would, at most, entitle
the store to judgment for their value, and the value of the eight tapes was
certainly not $549-nearly $70 each. The fact that the employee returned the
videos might reduce the judgment, but would not eliminate conversion liability,
so that the final amount of the judgment under tort principles might have been
the value of the tapes less the value restored to the store. 4 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 922 (1979). The point worth noting about Schlosser is not
that one might have reached a satisfying result if one viewed the case solely
from the perspective of property and tort, but that the court seems not to have
felt any need to do that. Rather, the court seemed entirely comfortable with
approaching the problem as an instance of restitution as substantive law. The
basic substantive principle was the unjust enrichment principle; the issue was
only how to compute the amount of the benefit.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44
cmt. a, at 153 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
61. 342 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
62. See generally 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 2.8.
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patent. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that
the doctors were entitled to recover and based that ruling squarely
and solely on the unjust enrichment principle.
The current Restatement draft includes an example based on the
University of Colorado Foundation case.63 The Restatement draft
states that an essential element of the case was a determination
that the professors "had ownership rights, protected by local law, in
the ideas and information at issue,"64 and that these rights were
misappropriated by the company. It is not entirely clear what the
draft means by the quoted phrase.65 Given the general approach of
the current draft, the notion presumably is that the law of
restitution does not itself determine whether the professors had a
species of property right in the idea; rather, that determination
must be based on other law. But, that is hardly the sense that one
would get by reading the opinion. The court treats plaintiffs' case as
based on the unjust enrichment principle. The court was certainly
not saying that state law could itself create a property interest in an
idea. Any such approach would have led the court directly into the
thicket of federal patent preemption. Rather, the opinion seems to
be based on the notion that the property interest is derived from
federal patent law, but plaintiffs' cause of action is based on the
diversion of the benefit of that property interest to defendant
through defendant's inappropriate conduct. The notion presumably
is that the professors had the right either to patent the idea
themselves or to forgo patent rights and allow the idea to pass into
the public domain. The wrongful act of defendant was in diverting
the benefit of that right to itself.
The University of Colorado Foundation scenario may be what
the Restatement has in mind in a passage suggesting that in some
situations related to intellectual property disputes, the law of
restitution provides "interstitial rules to govern cases not addressed
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42
cmt. e, illus. 3 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
64. Id.
65. Similar confusion is presented by other uses of the phrase "local law,"
or equivalent notions, in other passages. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. f, illus. 6, at 94-95 (Tentative
Draft No.4, 2005) (providing an illustration based on Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), stating that the court "determines that
the complaint states a cause of action under local law"); id. cmt. g, illus. 15, at
99 (providing an illustration based on Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946), stating that "[b]y the law of the jurisdiction,
an idea voluntarily submitted may be protected against 'misappropriation' if it
meets certain tests of originality and concreteness").
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by a given enactment.,,66 Federal patent law creates the property
right in the idea, but does not happen to speak to the diversion
problem presented in the University of Colorado Foundation case.
The thought behind the Restatement's reference to interstitial rules
is presumably that in such a situation, the law of restitution may fill
in the lacuna, though it remains the case that other law does the
principal work of defining right and wrong. But, on reflection, it is
far from clear that the situation is that simple. In the first place,
the "interstitial" notion is inconsistent with the claim that the law of
restitution does not itself determine right and wrong. An interstice
is, by definition, a hole. If you are going to fill that hole you have to
get the fill somewhere. If the fill comes from the law of restitution,
then it necessarily is the case that the law of restitution is providing
the substantive law.
Moreover, it is far from clear that issues of the sort involved in
University of Colorado Foundation can accurately be described as
minor additions to a basic structure established by other law. The
general scenario is that some body of law gives a package of rights to
the person who is first in line. Suppose that I do invent that
machine that causes watches to dematerialize and reappear on my
wrist. I go to the patent office to file my patent application.
Unbeknownst to me, the fellow in line just before me is filing a
patent application covering the same invention that he
independently devised. If his application gets filed before mine,
presumably it's tough luck for me.67 But, would our conclusion differ
depending on how he got in line before me? Suppose that he realizes
that we have competing patent applications. We are both standing
on the street waiting for a cab to go to the patent office. Rudely, he
jumps in front of me, gets in the cab, and makes it to the patent
office first. Do I have a restitution action against him? Suppose he
hits me with a stick, and thereby gets in the cab first. Do I have a
restitution action against him? These are not easy problems. For
example, in commercial law, it is well-settled that priority between
competing security interests in the same collateral is determined by
the temporal order of filing of financing statements.68 That priority
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42
cmt. a, at 86 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
67. Actually since writing this I have realized that in the United States
patent priority turns on the date of invention, not the date of filing. The
example works, however, in most of the rest of the world where patent priority
dates from filing, not invention. See 2 R. CARL May, May's WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 8.35 (4th ed. 2006). Or, if you prefer to stay in the United States, just change
the hypo so that the other fellow's skullduggery results in him inventing the
device first, e.g., he snuck into my lab and destroyed my preliminary work.
68. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2003).
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rule is routinely described as a "pure race" regime; that is, the first
to file has priority even if he filed with notice of an earlier unfiled
security interest.69 But, in some cases, courts have drawn on more
general concepts to subordinate the claim of someone who achieved
priority as a consequence of morally reprehensible conduct.70
The University of Colorado Foundation case presents a similar
problem. The issue is not whether one does or does not have
exclusive rights in the idea. That is an issue resolved by patent law,
just as the issue of priority among competing security interests is
resolved by the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 priority rule.
Rather, the issue is whether the company got the patent rights by
such wrongful conduct that it should not be entitled to enjoy the
benefits of the patent. There are a variety of ways that one might
describe the means by which the company got the patent rights. As
the current draft of the Restatement notes, the liability might be
described as based on the Section 42 principle of restitution for
interference with intellectual property rights, or the rules
concerning restitution of benefits obtained by fraud, by opportunistic
breach of contract, or by breach of confidence.71 That suggests
strongly that the University of Colorado Foundation case is another
illustration of the phenomenon earlier noted in connection with
Johnson v. Weedman and Schlosser v. Welk. The reason that
recovery was granted was the unjust enrichment principle itself.
Any description of the conduct as wrongful under other law was
really just the product of the conclusion based on the unjust
enrichment principle.
The independent role of the unjust enrichment principle can
also be seen in cases involving fiduciaries, or, more precisely, cases
at the fringes of the category of fiduciary relationships. It is well-
settled that a true fiduciary is not permitted to derive a personal
profit from the relationship, as in the common cases of trustees who
misappropriate trust assets, earn a profit with the assets, and then
return the assets to the trust.72 Similarly, the duty of loyalty
prevents a trustee from diverting to himself a profitable opportunity
that came to his attention by virtue of his fiduciary capacity.73 Most
69. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
24-3, at 843 (5th ed. 2000).
70. See, e.g., Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lowry, 570 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1978)
(subordinating claim where secured creditor who would otherwise have had
priority was an attorney who had represented one of the parties in the earlier
defectively implemented secured transaction).
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42
cmt. e, illus. 3 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
72. [d. § 43 cmt. c, illus. 5.
73. [d. § 43 cmt. d.
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such cases fit well within the approach taken in the current
Restatement; that is, the determination that it is wrongful for the
trustee to derive personal benefit from his fiduciary capacity is
based on principles developed within the law of fiduciaries rather
than being based on restitution as a separate body of law.74 But,
when one moves to the fringes of the category, it becomes far less
clear that trust law is central.
Consider the well-known English case of Reading v. Attorney
General. 75 A sergeant in the British army, stationed in Cairo, Egypt,
earned a considerable sum of money by agreeing to ride, in uniform,
on trucks being used by liquor smugglers, thereby avoiding
inspection of the trucks by the local police. The House of Lords
ruled that the Crown was entitled to recover the amount of the
profits that the sergeant had thereby obtained. Perhaps because the
case was decided at a time when a pure unjust enrichment theory
was regarded as somewhat suspicious by English courts,76 the
opinion does not itself treat the case an instance of unjust
enrichment. American commentators, however, have quite
uniformly regarded this as an unjust enrichment case, to be treated
as falling within the same general category as routine cases in
which a trustee derives personal profit from his fiduciary capacity.77
The current draft of the Restatement treats the situation as such,
albeit noting that the description of this as a "fiduciary" case is a bit
strained: "Courts may find a confidential relation (and a breach of
confidence) in some marginal cases, escaping classification
elsewhere, in which the defendant has gained an unjust benefit in
violation of a significant duty owed to the claimant.,,78
If one takes the general approach of the current draft of the
Restatement, one would have to say that the first question in the
Reading situation is whether this was a fiduciary or similar
confidential relationship. That would be an issue of the law of
74. In correspondence concerning an earlier draft of this Article, Professor
John D. McCamus pointed out to me that it may, in fact, be more historically
accurate to regard the unjust enrichment principle as the generative principle
of the rule that fiduciaries may not profit from the relationship, rather than as
playing a merely parasitic role. There is an excellent discussion of the fiduciary
cases in the treatise he coauthored, PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS,
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 576-87 (1990). For present purposes, however, it
suffices to note that the unjust enrichment principle does seem to play more
than a parasitic role in at least some fiduciary cases.
75. [1951) A.C. 507 m.L.).
76. See ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 11-14
(1966).
77. See 1 PALMER, supra note 11, § 2.11, at 149.
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43
cmt. f, at 134 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
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fiduciaries, not an issue of the law of restitution. Only after that
question of other law is resolved would one then invoke the principle
that restitution is available for profits derived from abuse of a
fiduciary or similar relationship. Yet that description hardly seems
apt. Without in any way meaning to suggest disrespect for members
of the armed services, an army sergeant is not what first comes to
mind when one thinks of the category of trustees or other
fiduciaries. Is it really accurate to say that the sergeant had to
disgorge the profit because he was a fiduciary? Isn't it more
accurate to say that we call him a fiduciary because we think that
he should disgorge the profit? Consider several variants of the facts.
Suppose that Reading had retired, or been fired, from the army, but
kept his uniform. He then wore the uniform while riding on the
trucks. Would he still be liable? Is it the actual uniform that
matters? Would the case be different if the sergeant returned his
army-issued uniform after having used it as a pattern to make a
copy from his own cloth? Or, suppose that he was so well-known as
a British sergeant that he could accomplish the same objective by
riding on the trucks in mufti? It is not entirely clear how we should
resolve those and other variants. But I very much suspect that in
puzzling through these problems we would begin by thinking about
whether it would be just for Reading to enrich himself in the
particular case. The conclusion that he was or was not a "fiduciary,"
or that the conduct was or was not an "abuse" of the fiduciary
relationship, is likely to be added as a convenient way of
categorizing the case rather than as the actual basis of decision.79
Much the same phenomenon can be seen in another well-known
case on the fringes of the law of fiduciaries, Harper v. Adametz.80
Seller hired a real estate broker to sell his house and farm. Plaintiff
told the broker that he would buy the entire property, but broker did
not convey that offer. Instead, the broker falsely told the seller that
plaintiff was interested in only part of the tract. Broker arranged a
79. The situation is quite similar to cases where an employer seeks to
impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of an employee's embezzlement.
The constructive trust device, which developed within the law of true
fiduciaries, has been used for remedial purposes in any situation where a
wrongdoer profitably invests the stolen money. See 1 PALMER, supra note 11, §
2.14. But, in some of the early cases, lawyers may have feared that the
fiduciary notion would be taken seriously, leading to bizarre descriptions such
as the assertion that a bank janitor's duties were "to sweep the bank's offices, to
arrange and care for the furniture therein, and, while in the discharge of his
said duties, to watch over, guard, and preserve, to the extent of his ability, all
property of the bank." Neb. Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 71 N.W. 294, 295 (Neb.
1897).
80. 113 A.2d 136 (Conn. 1955).
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sale of the entire property to a straw man acting for him, and then
sold a portion to the buyer. As a result, the seller got what he
expected to receive for the entire parcel, the buyer got part of the
land for the amount he was willing to pay for that part, and the
broker ended up getting most of the land for a small payment. If the
seller had sued, the case would not have presented any real
difficulty. The broker would be precluded from deriving a personal
profit from the transaction. But the seller did not sue. Rather, the
action was brought by the buyer.8l It is hard to see any harm
suffered by the buyer, and the broker was not a fiduciary for the
buyer. But, as in Reading, there is one thing that seems abundantly
clear. When the dust settles, the broker should not be permitted to
enrich himself by his clever scheme. I don't think it is accurate to
regard that as the result of an analysis of other law concerning the
arrangement. Rather, that seems to be the reason for the
conclusion.
The independent substantive role of the unjust enrichment
principle becomes even clearer in situations where there is no well-
settled other law. A good example is Cablevision of Breckenridge,
Inc. v. Tannhauser Condominium Ass'n.82 A condominium
association had subscribed to a community antenna television
service, paying the specified charge for each condominium unit.
Then, a tinkerer resident evidently decided that it was silly for the
association to pay the charge for each unit. He could, and did, wire
up his own distribution system within the condominium so that all
units could have the TV service, though the association paid only for
three units. The cable company sued, seeking to recover the amount
that the association would have paid if it had continued to pay at
the set rate for each unit. The complaint evidently adopted a
scattershot approach to the search for an appropriate legal theory,83
but the parties soon settled on a single issue-whether the
complaint stated a cause of action under a theory of implied
contract. The Colorado Supreme Court eventually concluded that
the cable company could recover on the basis of unjust enrichment.84
The opinion hardly suggests that the court believed that the
outcome turned on any body of law other than the law of restitution.
The court began with the proposition that one can recover on the
81. The litigious inclination of the buyer may well be attributable to the
fact that he was the well-known Yale Law School professor Fowler V. Harper.
82. 649 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1982).
83. "Cablevision's amended complaint contained eight claims for relief,
including breach of contract, concealment, conversion, various claims of unjust
enrichment, and a request for injunctive relief." Id. at 1095.
84. The opinion is noteworthy for its horribly garbled discussion of "implied
contracts" and "quasi-contract," id. at 1096, quoted at the outset of this Article.
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basis of unjust enrichment if one shows that plaintiff conferred a
benefit upon defendant, that defendant made use of the benefit, and
that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit
without payment. Considering those elements in turn, the court
concluded that recovery was appropriate. There was no effort in the
opinion to describe the cable company's interest as some form of
property, nor was there any discussion of the agreement between
the cable company and the condominium association. Rather, the
court concluded that recovery was warranted simply because it was
unjust for the condominium association to receive the benefit of
cable service to each unit while paying only for a few units.
In assessing the role of the unjust enrichment principle in the
Cablevision of Breckenridge case, it is important to note the date.
The opinion was rendered in 1982, and the underlying facts occurred
in the mid-1970s. Cable TV was then in its infancy. Indeed, the
word was even a bit different-the service was then described as
"community antenna television." All that was involved was putting
up a big antenna to receive local over-the-air broadcasts and
distributing the signal to the subscribers. No Fox, no TBS
Superstation, no 24-hour Law and Order orgies, no mud-wrestling
channel, no pay-per-view movie channels. Just the three, or maybe
four, local broadcast stations. Because the service was new, there
was essentially no specialized legal regime governing it.85 But the
problem of piracy presented itself as soon as the service developed.
In cases like Cablevision of Breckenridge courts were left to figure
out how to devise a remedy for an act that simply seemed to be
wrongful.86 If the problem were presented today, the solution would
be easy. With the maturation of the cable TV industry, a specific
legal regime developed. Though practical problems of policing
remain severe, the legal problem of unauthorized reception is now
resolved by statute.87 But, at the time of the Cablevision of
Breckenridge case, that legal development was still in the future. It
85. There had been some efforts, with mixed results, to base a remedy for
unauthorized reception on an old provision of federal law. See generally Daniel
G. Spraul, Comment, Decoding Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act;
A Cause ofAction for Unauthorized Reception of Subscription Television, 50 U.
CIN. L. REV. 362 (1981).
86. One is reminded of the "I know it when I see it" definition of
pornography. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.s. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
87. A provision of the 1984 federal statute on cable TV specifically creates
civil liability, as well as criminal penalties, for the unauthorized use of cable TV
transmissions, 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2000), and most states now have similar
statutes, see 1 DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER
NONBROADCASTVIDEO: LAW AND POLICY § 5:89 (2006).
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is precisely in such a setting that the unjust enrichment principle
plays its most important substantive role. Distinguishing mine from
thine is easy when we are speaking of land or simple chattels. The
substantive law of property and the remedial law of tort have had
centuries to develop concepts of ownership and remedies of trespass
and conversion. But when the subject matter is new, courts are
bound to encounter situations in which established legal concepts do
not quite fit. That is the time when the unjust enrichment principle
can playa particularly useful independent role.
All right, I have put it off long enough.
Isn't it a complete rejoinder to the argument advanced herein
simply to whisper the name International News Service v. Associated
Pressts In that famous, or infamous, decision the Supreme Court
approved an injunction precluding International News Service
("INS") from copying and distributing to its subscribers news
accounts that it had copied from Associated Press. In a nutshell, the
basis of the decision was that INS was "endeavoring to reap where it
has not sown."S9 The potential sweep of that notion has scared
judges and commentators ever since.90 Mter all, reaping where one
has not sown is a pretty good definition of civilization. Even
confined to the specific setting of unfair competition, the tendency
has been to minimize the potential impact of the decision. As the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition notes:
Although courts have occasionally invoked the INS decision on
an ad hoc basis to grant relief against other commercial
appropriations, they have not articulated coherent principles
for its application. It is clear that no general rule of law
prohibits the appropriation of a competitor's ideas,
innovations, or other intangible assets once they become
publicly known. In addition, the federal patent and copyright
statutes now preempt a considerable portion of the domain in
which the common law tort might otherwise apply.... The
better approach, and the one most likely to achieve an
appropriate balance between the competing interests, does not
recognize a residual common law tort ofmisappropriation.91
88. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
89. Id. at 239.
90. For a sampling of the commentary, see James A. Rahl, The Right to
"Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 56 (1962). For a more recent
review, including warning of potential revival of the INS approach in
connection with current developments in intellectual property, see Wendy J.
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. b, at 411 (1993)
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At least within the field of unfair competition, the INS
"restitutionary impulse,,92 has been limited by complex doctrines of
federal preemption concerning patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
Isn't the thesis of the present Article tantamount to a suggestion
that the INS monster be let out of the box and given free reign to
ramble about all areas of law, leaving a trail of confusion and
uncertainty?
Whether it is or is not accurate to regard INS itself as the
poster child for the dangers of an overly aggressive role for the
unjust enrichment principle,93 it is an important question whether
we are safer if we say that other law always defines what conduct is
wrongful or if we say that, in at least some cases, the unjust
enrichment principle is itself the basis of judgments of right and
wrong. One way to assess that issue is to examine an area where
the unjust enrichment principle might have played an important
independent role, but, in fact, did not do so. The development of the
right of publicity is a good example.94 In that development, one does
find isolated references to unjust enrichment concepts. Some of the
language in Judge Frank's seminal opinion in Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. suggests an unjust enrichment
rationale.95 Kalven mentioned the point explicitly in his well-known
article, noting that the rationale for protecting a right of publicity "is
the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the
theft of good Will.,,96 But, for the most part, the law on the right of
(citation omitted).
92. See Gordon, supra note 90.
93. For a more sympathetic reaction to the case, see Richard A. Epstein,
International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of
Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85 (1992).
94. I make no effort herein at a comprehensive treatment of the issue. For
general discussion, see, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PuBLICITY
AND PRIVACY (2d ed. 2004). The first chapter of that four-volume treatise
presents a useful overview of the complex history of the development of the
rights of privacy and publicity in American law.
95. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) ("We think that, in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy ... a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph.... This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.").
96. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966). Kalven's comment
achieved even greater notoriety by virtue of its quotation by Justice White in
the well-known "human cannonball" case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad.
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
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publicity has developed quite independently of the law of restitution,
with much of the discussion and controversy centered on
differentiating the right of publicity from the right of privacy
founded on Warren and Brandeis' famous article.97 One now finds
whole treatises devoted to the right of publicity,98 and the subject is
treated by the American Law Institute as a part of the law on unfair
t 't' 99compe I IOn.
One might see the development of the right of publicity as a
perfect model of the approach approved and adopted in the current
draft of the Restatement. The area has not developed as a branch of
the law of restitution itself but as an independent body of law. But
the subject also illustrates some of the dangers of that approach.
One of the most controversial issues in the law of publicity is
whether the right dies with the person or descends to the person's
heirs. 10o A dispassionate observer would, I think, conclude that
discussion of that controversy has been significantly weakened by
the "argument" that the right of publicity is a "property right" and
therefore must have postmortem duration just like any other
property right. Suppose that a stronger tie had been maintained
between the right of publicity and the law of restitution. Courts
considering whether a right of publicity could be exercised by heirs
would have to confront directly not only the question whether it is
unjust for someone to profit by exploitation of another's name or
likeness, but also whether it is appropriate for someone other than
the person in question to enforce that right. That question is very
much like the issue in Reading u. Attorney General and Harper u.
Adametz. To be sure, both of those cases did allow a third party to
sue for disgorgement of profits, but it is quite clear in both cases
that the action was allowed not because plaintiff was particularly
entitled to the recovery, but because it seemed clear that defendant
should not be able to retain the benefit and there was no one else
around to sue. That issue looks very different from the claim that
the great-grandchildren of Robert Schumann are entitled to recover
from someone who exploits his fame because Schumann had a
"property right" in his name and that right must have descended to
h · h' 101IS elrs.
97. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
98. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 94.
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1993).
100. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 94, ch. 9.
101. Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). Of
course, plaintiffs lost that case. My point is only that it is unlikely in the
extreme that the cause of action could have been asserted with a straight face
were it not for the seeming logic of the argument that the right was a property
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Consider a case like Reading v. Attorney General. Should the
problem be regarded as part of the law of fiduciary relationships, or
should it be regarded as part of the law of restitution? If the issue is
treated purely as a matter of fiduciary relationships, the focus is
likely to be on whether the relationship is sufficiently similar to
other fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary cases to fall within the principle
that a fiduciary is not permitted to profit from the relationship.
Treated as a substantive restitution case, the issues would be
whether it is unjust for the sergeant to obtain profit from his
position, and whether the enrichment should be recoverable by the
government. That focus might lead us to reflect more deeply on
whether we really are prepared to treat any profits obtained by
someone who might be labeled a "fiduciary" as profits that must be
disgorged. Would the United States have an action against any
former president to recover the profits that the former president
makes from speeches and other public appearances? Presumably
not, even though one might well say that the only reason that
former presidents can become rich making speeches is that they are
just that-former presidents. Would a law firm have an action
against one of its partners to recover profits that the partner makes
from publishing a law book? Probably not, though it is worth noting
that many firms, by agreement, do treat any law-related income
obtained by partners as earnings of the partnership. The problems
are hard, but reflection on similar problems in other areas of the law
of restitution may assist in resolving them.
VII. CONCLUSION
Relatively minor changes would be required to make the
current draft of the Restatement consistent with the view that, in
some cases, the law of restitution does itself playa role in deciding
what conduct is wrongful. First, the black letter text should be
revised to eliminate the explicit ties between restitution recovery
and the remedial aspects of the law of tort. The place where this
problem is clearest is Section 40, which currently covers only cases
of "trespass or conversion.,,102 A more accurate formulation was used
in an earlier draft, which provided for restitution of benefits
obtained "by wrongful interference with legally-protected rights in
tangible property.,,103 With that change, each section of this chapter
can be regarded as deliberately open on the question whether the
right.
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
(Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40
(Preliminary Draft No.6, 2004).
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line between rightful and wrongful conduct is drawn by other law or,
at least in part, by the unjust enrichment principle itself. The
comments could discuss that issue explicitly, perhaps following the
model of the passage in the current comments on the "interstitial"
role of the unjust enrichment principle in areas where other law is
the primary but not exclusive source of judgments about right and
wrong. 104 All of the passages in the comments in the current draft
that insist that other law always draws that line should be
reformulated. It is appropriate and accurate to state that in most
cases, other law draws that line. It is not appropriate or accurate to
say that is true in all cases. Of course, if other law has concluded
that no remedy is required for certain conduct, then one should be
very careful about suggesting that a remedy is available on the basis
of the unjust enrichment principle. The comments to Section 39 on
benefits obtained by opportunistic breach of contract might provide
a good model. Finally, some of the illustrations should be revised to
make them more accurate reflections of the approach taken in
decided cases by eliminating the confusing references to other law in
cases where the basis of decision in the actual case was the unjust
enrichment principle itself.
Initially, it may seem that the approach taken in the current
Restatement draft may limit the extent to which the unjust
enrichment principle may, in Dawson's memorable phrase, "indude]
quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock.,,105 On reflection,
however, the opposite seems more likely. Even if one adopts the
approach taken in the current draft of the Restatement, the unjust
enrichment principle will continue to play some role in the
development of the fringes of the categories now covered in the
chapter on restitution for wrongs. Under the approach taken in the
current Restatement draft, however, a court addressing such an
issue should not regard it as a matter of the law of restitution.
Rather the court should first consider whether as a matter of "local
law" the conduct should or should not be treated as wrongful. Only
ifthe court does decide, on the basis of other law, that the conduct is
wrongful would the issue then fall within the scope of the
Restatement of Restitution. The result would be quite ironic.
Notions of unjust enrichment are bound to influence that decision,
but the court might well not see the analogy to other difficult issues
that are treated in the Restatement of Restitution. Curiously, then,
under the approach adopted in the current draft of the Restatement
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42
cmt. a, at 86 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2005).
105. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 8
(1951).
 92 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
of Restitution, the most interesting, novel, and difficult issues about
restitution for wrongful conduct would not fall within the scope of
the project.
